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Abstract
People commonly believe that any form of deception, no matter how
innocuous it is and no matter whether the deceiving person intended
it otherwise, is always morally wrong. In this paper, I will argue that
deceiving in real-time is morally distinguishable from deceiving on-
line because online actions aren’t as fine-grained as actions occurring
in real-time. Our failure to detect the fine-grained characteristics of
another avatar leads us to believe that that avatar intended to do
a moral harm. Openly deceiving someone on Facebook or Twitter
is not a way to build wholesome virtual friendships but to destroy
them. This paper will show how the traditional understanding of
the doing / allowing distinction fails to apply in cyberspace.
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deceiving in real-time is morally distinguishable from deceiving online
because online actions are not as morally innocuous as actions occurring
in real-time. Our failure to detect the fine-grained characteristics of an-
other virtual avatar leads us to believe that the person intended to do a
moral harm. Openly deceiving someone on Facebook or Twitter is not a
way to build wholesome virtual friendships but to destroy them. This pa-
per will show how the traditional understanding of the doing / allowing
distinction fails to apply in cyberspace.
1 Innocuous passive deception
In this section and the next, I will provide some examples of deception we
commonly employ in our lives that do not yield a moral harm. If the con-
sequence of these forms of deception are not morally wrong, then we will
have to entertain the possibility that online actions of virtual avatars are
not morally harmful. What I will go on to show is that online deception
lacks some of the characteristics of real-time deception. Missing these
characteristics show that online deception cannot help but be morally
harmful.
Suppose Alma and Bonita are deeply in love with one another and
have been together for a very long time. They have such a tight emo-
tional bond with one another that each of them knows that the other
would never do anything to harm the other or the relationship they have
cultivated over the years. One morning Alma and Bonita decide that they
should treat themselves to a night of dinner and dancing. Both agree to
meet for dinner at 6:00pm. Alma arrives at the restaurant around 5:50pm
only to discover that Bonita has not arrived yet. The maitre d’ seats Alma,
even though Bonita has not arrived. After she has been seated, Alma
sends a text message to Bonita asking her whereabouts. Bonita, though
comfortably seated in a business meeting with colleagues that will not
likely end for another ten minutes, responds with the following message:
“OTW.”1 Although, in fact, Bonita is not on the way to meet Alma, her
text’s content expresses to Alma that she is on her way. This implies that
Bonita has deceived Alma.
Under the circumstances, We ought not believe that Bonita harmed
1OTW is txtspeak shorthand for “On the way.”
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Alma, even though Bonita has clearly deceived Alma into believing that
she is on her way to the restaurant. Conversationally, in txtspeak any-
how, “OTW” means not only that a person is physically moving toward
a particular destination but also that one will be on the way shortly, one
is on the way but ran into someone on the way out the door, or—perhaps
as is more frequently the case in larger metropolitan areas—one is stuck
in pedestrian or vehicle traffic and should arrive shortly.
Despite that there are these other alternative meanings to “OTW,”
what Bonita has texted to Alma is what one might call a bald-face lie.
Bonita is in the meeting. She’s not walking out the door. She’s not stuck
in traffic. She’s not even intending to leave the meeting early to meet
up with her long-time friend, partner, and lover for the dinner they
planned earlier in the day. So, the alternative conversational implicatures
of “OTW” do not apply in this case.
Further evidence seems to rule against a charitable reading of Bonita’s
text message. There is no doubt that Bonita will be on her way as soon
as the meeting ends ten minutes hence. The trouble is that the form of
the text message suggests she’s on her way to meeting Alma right now.
Texting Alma that she’s “OTW” suggests to Alma that Bonita is “walking”
or “driving” towards the restaurant. The use of an acronym in place of
the phrase, “On the way,” suggests the text was sent in haste with some
urgency. Moreover, it triggers in Alma’s mind that she should not follow
up that message with another because it could distract Bonita, whether
she’s driving or walking to the restaurant.2
Suppose the story were to continue in the following way: Bonita ar-
rives thirty minutes late to the restaurant and pleads with great suppli-
cation for Alma to forgive her for being so tardy. Bonita’s telling Alma
where she was when she txt-ed Alma does not improve her thinning
patience. Perhaps surprisingly Alma is not quite angry with Bonita for
making her wait at the restaurant. Bonita could have called Alma before
the meeting began warning her of a belated arrival. That might not even
cross Alma’s mind; instead, she’s happy to see Bonita, have some dinner
and fun with her very close and loving friend.
Under other circumstances, Alma might not be so accommodating.
2One might argue that since Bonita is in a business meeting her use of “OTW” is
justifiably urgent because she does not want to be disturbed by Alma again. Even if one
were to argue that her being in a business meeting justifies Bonita’s use of acronyms, it
hardly saves her from the charge that she’s lied to her close friend, Alma.
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For instance, if Alma discovered that Bonita had been unfaithful or that
Bonita had drained her bank accounts and moved to Acapulco, Alma
probably would not have been as forgiving as she was this evening. Why
is this the case? In all of the examples, Bonita lied to and deceived Alma.
In some cases we seem to overlook deception, while in others it’s difficult
to turn a blind eye to it.
The case of Alma and Bonita is just one way in which we deceive our
closest friends, spouses, or siblings using social networking platforms,
such as txt-ing.3 The deception did not result in harming either Alma
or Bonita, but what Bonita did was morally wrong if we believe that we
ought not lie to others, especially if it as self-serving as the lie Bonita told
Alma.
Perhaps one would not want to call what Bonita did an act of lying.
She might have overlooked the fact that her meeting might continue for
thirty minutes. On one commonly held definition of lying, it is the act
of making a false statement with the intention to deceive (Kagan, 1998).
Since Bonita may not have intended to deceive Alma, she did not lie
to her. We might even say that Bonita did not deceive Alma. Regard-
less, overlooking a particular fact seemingly frees Bonita from any moral
wrongdoing because she did not intend to deceive her lover and long-time
partner. Given that no moral harm resulted from Bonita’s txt, we judge
her passive act of deception to be harmless and innocuous.
2 Innocuous active deception
In the previous section, we were introduced to a real-time example, i.e.,
one commonly occurring in the actual world amid practical affairs, where
a person’s permitting someone else to be deceived did not result in any
kind of moral harm. So, we concluded that the act involved no moral
wrongdoing. We might call such cases ‘innocuous passive deception’. A
critic might contend that such innocuous actions that involve no moral
3For purposes of this paper, I consider all forms of technology that provide us with a
greater reach to others a “social network.” Not only will the usual suspects be discussed,
like Facebook, Twitter, SnapChat, Pinterest, LinkedIn, etc., but also the less obvious
examples of social networking: smartphones, the internet, chatrooms, discussion boards,
blogs, etc. I realize that this is fairly wide definition of social networking with which
some might take issue.
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wrongdoing are not forms of deception. The critic maintains that all
forms of deception yield harmful or painful results, so those sorts of ac-
tions that fail to fit into such a category must not be a form of deception.
In this section, I will argue that there are active forms of deception that
fail to be a case of moral wrongdoing. Despite the critic’s conception of
deception always involving a moral harm and moral wrongdoing. these
examples of active deception are just as innocuous and morally inert as
the example of Alma and Bonita. Once I have shown that innocuous
forms of active deception involve no moral wrongdoing, I will be able
to discuss cases of online deception that do not divide easily between
innocuous and egregious forms of active and passive deception. If this
is true, then the kind of nuance our real-time behaviors permit do not
translate into permissible online behaviors. We ought, then, refrain from
performing any action online that could be understood as an egregious
and morally harmful action.
One might believe, as the critic appears to believe, that as opposed to
the moral inertness of innocuous passive deception it must be the case
that all forms of active deception are morally harmful and, therefore, a
good example of moral wrongdoing. There are cases of active deception
which do not clearly show the action to be a moral wrongdoing. The
singular feature that stands out in these active forms of deception is that
the agent acted intentionally. The agent intended to lie or to deceive
others. Because of this, we might believe that it is morally wrong.
Some deceptive acts are undertaken (and intentionally so) not to harm
others but to protect others (and oneself) from harm. Soldiers, for ex-
ample, wear camouflage uniforms to hide from and to deceive enemy
combatants. Some camouflage is more effective than other forms of cam-
ouflage because it enables soldiers to blend in with the elements of the en-
vironment. Deceiving enemy soldiers using camouflage preserves enemy
combatant soldiers from harm, and not wearing camouflage, especially
in light of strategies adopted in modern warfare (e.g., guerrilla tactics),
would mean certain death.4
4Conventional war-time strategy where soldiers meet on the battlefield in regular
and patterned formation had to be abandoned shortly following the invention of high-
velocity automatic weaponry, e.g., the machine gun. Too many casualties were suffered
because regular formation made the soldier vulnerable to any unskilled marksman.
According to legend, for instance, at the Battle of the Somme (1916), an estimated 20,000
British soldiers were killed in the first twenty minutes of the battle by Axis machine
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Wearing camouflage is certainly a form of deception. In fact, it is
an intentional form of deception where an agent intends to deceive en-
emy combatants. Donning camouflage battle-dress protects the soldier
wearing it by not permitting enemy combatants to detect his presence. If
enemy combatants cannot detect a soldier’s presence, then they will not
know that their enemy is close. If the enemy cannot detect the proxim-
ity of enemy soldiers, then they will be less likely to open fire and bring
about a fire-fight or, worse yet, inflict harm upon the soldiers or nearby
innocent civilians. I believe it goes without saying that wearing camou-
flage is not morally wrong; in fact, one might go so far as to contend that
not wearing camouflage in battle is not only uncouth but reckless and,
therefore, possibly morally forbidden, even as an activity in an unjust
war.
Besides the use of camouflage in war time, there are other forms of
innocuous active deception. Think here of the boss who lays off an em-
ployee because she hates that the employee always submits work after
institution-wide deadlines. When the boss “fires” the employee (after fil-
ing the appropriate paperwork, of course), she might say “the company
has terminated the position you occupy” or “the company’s moving in
a different direction.” Eliminating one’s position in the company is not
identical to “firing” the employee because the employee might believe
that the company can no longer afford to pay for the skills he possesses.
In a sense, the employee does not feel that the company or administrators
have “fired” him but that the company can no longer afford the services
the employee provides. Of course, the boss has bamboozled the (now ex-)
employee because it is the employee’s failure to submit material on-time
that has brought about the “separation.”
The boss’ firing is an active form of deception because she intends to
deceive the employee. The boss’ reason for action is to ensure separation
of the employee from the company because the employee has failed to
uphold terms of the contract which include following the guidelines set
in the original job description. Undoubtedly, a part of that job description
will be to follow company policies and procedures. One of those policies
will likely involve an explanation of submitting work by the prescribed
gunners who took advantage of the soldiers “going over the top” and “running across
the desolate no-man’s-land.” With nowhere to run or to hide, German gunners very
easily cut down, quite literally, the advancing British.
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deadline administrators and managers mandate. Since the boss tells the
employee a bogus reason for removing the employee from the position in
the company, the boss has lied and intentionally deceived the employee.
Despite the outright deception perpetrated by the employer in this
case, our reaction to it might not be to ascribe some sense of moral wrong-
doing to the employer; instead, our intuition tells us that the employer
seemingly has preserved and protected the employee’s psyche´. No moral
harm comes to the employee. Thus, there seems liitle reason to think that
what the employer has done is morally wrong.
The business world is pregnant with examples of deception. Besides
the one just outlined regarding the firing of an employee, there is the
more common situation in which job-seekers tend to inflate their own
self-worth, either in a resume or in a cover letter accompanying a job
application. The job applicant might embellish the responsibilities of a
previous job or bedeck line upon line of a resume with nearly false but
not untrue statements about honors for which the job candidate had been
“nominated.” The statements are considered harmless because search
committee members know that job candidates want to look better to them
than they actually are because they want seek at least an interview if not
landing a job with the company.5
Like the example of firing the employee is innocuous, so too is the
job seeker who reports near falsehoods on a resume. The job candidate
intends to deceive the reader into believing that the near falsehoods are
accurate representations of the accomplishments. Since members of the
business world have come to expect some exaggeration from job can-
didates and no moral harm arises from these near falsehoods, it seems
inappropriate to call what the job seeker is doing is morally wrong. Even
the most fastidious search committee member would overlook the candi-
date’s taradiddle.
5In the academic world, it is an open secret that many letter writers, particularly
those from well-established prestigious universities, knowingly deceive search commit-
tees with high praise in confidential letters of recommendation. So much so is this true
in philosophy that letter writers have begun writing letters in a code only very few
members of the philosophy profession understand. When educated search committee
members review the letter, they know that the letter writer believes candidate-X is a
top-notch researcher and should be placed at an R-1 research university or whether the
candidate is best fit for a liberal arts university and college. Unfortunately, not everyone
is aware of this code and remains deceived by what would otherwise be considered a
good letter of recommendation.
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Perhaps in reading the above examples one might conclude that in-
nocuous active deception is mostly found in professions and circum-
stances where the agent justifies a certain means to reach a highly bene-
ficial end. In war, soldiers want to survive. As a means of survival, they
must wear camouflage. In business, job candidates and employers seek
success. As a means to success, they must report half-truths. If there
are other more intimate settings in which active deception arises, then we
might be less dismissive of the other examples.
There are, in fact, intimate settings in which active deception seems to
occur. Many of them focus on relationships in families. Suppose that a
parent takes away a loud toy from a child because it is too loud, but the
parent tells the child that the toy is broken. The toy is not broken, but the
parent intentionally deceives the child so that they do not have to listen
to the loud toy any longer. No moral harm comes to the child, even if the
child really wants to play with the toy that has been taken away. In this
example, the parent intends to deceive the child by telling her that the toy
is broken and is no longer fit for play, even though the parent knows the
toy is in perfect working order.
Similarly, think of the parent who tells a child that “Santa Claus will
not be bringing her any toys this Christmas because she’s been a naughty
little girl.” This is doubly deceiving. First, there is no Santa Claus to
bring gifts to the little girl. Santa Claus is a fictitious entity who does not
exist. The parent has perpetuated a lie about the existence of an entity
that does not actually exist. Second, the deceit seems a way for parents to
get what they want from the child—in this instance, they are treating the
child merely as a means to an end. Acting nice, the child will get what
she wants and the parents will get what they want—perhaps, a better
behaved child. The parent’s telling the child Santa will not be delivering
presents to her is doubly deceiving, but it is a common tactic parents use
to get what they want from a child.
In the last two sections, I have introduced examples occurring in real-
time that seem to show there are morally innocuous forms of active and
passive deception. The question with which we will be concerned in
the next two sections is whether active and passive deception occurring
online and in virtual social worlds are equally morally innocuous. It is
my contention that the conditions for active and passive deception do not
easily translate from the real-time world to the virtual world. Netizens
ought to exercise greater care in their deceptive behavior than they would
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in real-time affairs because online behaviors have real-time consequences,
some of which—unfortuntely, as we have witnessed—can be catastrophic.
3 Online deception, innocuous or dangerous?
There is a widespread belief that the real-time world and the virtual world
are completely distinct. We live life differently in each, and we believe
that the things we say and do in the virtual world does not carryover to
the real-time world. In the previous section, I set out to show that there
are innocuous forms of active and passive deception. For this section, I
will begin by briefly illustrating why we believe the online virtual world
and the real-time world are distinguishable. Then, I will show that our
belief in this distinction is wrong. An argument for this view will come in
§4 in a discussion of doing something versus letting something happen.
Finally, in the last section (§5), I will show how virtual world deception,
whether active or passive, yields seriously harmful consequences. If my
analysis is correct, then we should refrain from deceiving others online.
There is a distance between us and virtual netizens that permit us to
do and to say things that we would not normally do or say to people on
the street. When the internet began to take shape and online interactions
were more common toward the end of the 1990s, I can remember entering
a chat room named “Philosophy” or “Nietzsche on Value.” I presumed
that we would have a discussion about the chatroom’s title. Sometimes
the discussion was fruitful, but most of the time it was not. Online chat
rooms had the tendency to devolve into school playground arguments.
Arguments would amount to “yah-huh” and “nun-ahh.” What should
have passed for an enlightening chat became nothing interesting whatso-
ever.
There is at least one reason why school yard arguments take place in
online forums. The discussants use anonymous handles. Anonymity pro-
vides them the opportunity to use baseless claims and offer unguarded
opinions. The degeneration of the discussion might have been avoided if
members of the chatroom had not anonymized their own profiles. Pro-
files, at least in the 1990s, were easy to anonymize. Discussants could
easily cloak their own identity. For example, the only thing known about
the person chatting was their handle, “fideo1991” or “veritasetvirtus.”
Handles typically do not provide an adequate amount of information to
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identify the handle with any person.
There was no other place one could be as anonymous as they were
when they were online. This is true today, too. Look at any New York
Times editorial generating interest and comments among its readers, and
it is easy to find a few anonymous commentators posting ugly opinions
surreptitiously.
Fast-forward to the current era of social networking sites like Facebook
or LinkedIn. Although it is not recommended, one can create fictitious
Facebook or Twitter accounts.6 A person is capable of manipulating one’s
online identity in a way he is unable to do so in real-time. A person
wandering around town in a mask would likely garner some attention
from not only ordinary people but the local authorities as well. Given
that manipulation of one’s identity is so easy to do online, this seems
to be one underlying reason why we believe the online world and the
real-time world is distinct.
Clandestine interactions online have a far greater possibility of going
undetected than secret meetings in real-time. No matter what it is a per-
son does in real-time there is a chance that the encounter will be filmed
by closed-circuit televisions, that the N.S.A. is watching, or the encounter
is being surveilled by a private investigator. Even if the person wears
a costume, mask, wig, or fake mustache, the existence of facial recogni-
tion software or other means of identifying a person will give away the
person’s true identity. No such luck online. It seems possible to cruise
the internet undetected without any repercussions for the individual who
covertly engages in nefarious and illicit affairs.
For these reasons, I believe culture has disentangled the world wide
web from the web of humanity. No longer do we believe that our online
behavior has any serious consequences, good or bad, in real-time. The
trouble is that our online behavior does have consequences.
There have been tragic consequences resulting from the creation and
maintenance of fake social networking profiles. Megan Meier, a 13-year-
old girl suffering from depression and attention deficit disorder, com-
mitted suicide after a “fake” person she began corresponding with on
MySpace ended their friendship. It was discovered later that the “fake”
person’s profile had been set up by neighborhood bullies who berated
6In fact, if I am not mistaken, I believe Facebook has a policy against the creation and
maintenance of accounts of fictitious virtual people.
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Megan in chats had on the once popular social networking site. In an-
other incident, Brandon Wentzell consumed a lethal cocktail of vodka
and Dilaudid after his long-distance Facebook girlfriend, Clarissa Chis-
tiakov, canceled an in-person meeting and discontinued the relationship
they had fostered. It turns out that Clarissa did not exist.
The consequences of any action can be either good or bad. Whenever
we consider deceitful behavior, we think that the outcome will be bad
for whatever agent is the victim of the deceit. Online behavior seems
to make one more prone to being a victim of bad action because of the
anonymity involved in online interactions. If it is possible for us to refrain
from behaving badly online and to prevent bad things from happening
to other members of the social network, then we have a moral obligation
to prevent unnecessary suffering of our fellow internet surfers (cf. Singer
1971). Not doing anything seems tantamount to permitting very bad
things to happen to others who are innocent cyber-bystanders.
Now that I have argued for the view that the real-time world is not
easily distinguished from the online world, I can move on and discuss
one way in which we might justify to ourselves why we let certain things
happen on the internet we would not otherwise allow in real-time. We be-
lieve there is some spatial distance between us and other cyber-travelers.
If no such distance justifies treating others differently online, then we
must cautiously approach the distinction between doing and allowing
online. Since the doing/allowing relationship resembles the connection
between active/passive deception, we also have reason to give up such a
distinction online.
4 Doing vs. Allowing
It seems intuitively obvious that doing some harmful act is morally worse
than allowing some harmful act to occur. No matter how clear our intu-
itions may seem to be, controversy over the question, “Is doing harm
morally worse than merely permitting harm to occur?” still remains.
Suppose that a doctor may save six innocent people only if he takes the
vital organs, such as the heart, lungs, liver, and kidneys, from a healthy
prisoner. To do so the doctor will have to end the prisoner’s life. This
seems like a morally reprehensible act.
For a second case, instead of the doctor having to terminate the pris-
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oner’s life, suppose that the prisoner is allowed to die. The doctor refrains
from putting the prisoner on life support system. After the prisoner’s
brain ceases functioning he performs the surgery to save six people’s
lives. Our intuitions tell us that the second scenario seems to be less
morally problematic than the first one.
Permitting a person to die in order to save six people seems less prob-
lematic than deliberately ending a person’s life in order to save six peo-
ple. There are numerous ways to account for the distinction between do-
ing and allowing (cf Bennett, 1966, 1993; Dinello, 1971; Lichtenberg, 1982;
Steinbock and Norcross, 1994), of which the most sophisticated analyses
is Warren Quinn (1989).
Quinn has argued that the distinction between doing and allowing
depends on whether an agent’s most direct contribution is an action or
an inaction.
Harmful positive agency is that in which an agent’s most di-
rect contribution to the harm is an action, whether his own or
that of some object. Harmful negative agency is that in which
the most direct contribution is an inaction, a failure to prevent
the harm. (Quinn, 1989, 301f)
Quinn explains that an agent’s most direct contribution to a:
harmful upshot of his agency is the contribution that most di-
rectly explains the harm. And one contribution explains harm
more directly than another if the explanatory value of the sec-
ond is exhausted in the way it explains the first. (Quinn, 1989,
301)
The primary difference is beteween cases where an agent produces the
harm by an action and cases in which an agent produces the harm by in-
action. Ending the prisoner’s life is an action, and refraining from putting
the prisoner on life support is an inaction. Since ending the prisoner’s life
is an action and is the contribution that most directly explains the harm,
the agent, on Quinn’s view, is positively relevant to a harmful upshot.
Therefore, ending the prisoner’s life is worse than refraining from putting
the prisoner on life support.
Quinn offers a range of cases to show that the distinction between
doing and allowing depends on the agent’s most direct contribution being
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an action. In Rescue I, an agent may choose to save five people in danger
of drowning or the agent may choose to save one person. The agent
cannot save all six. If the agent decides to save the five people at the
expense of the one person, the agent’s most direct contribution to the one
person’s death is an inaction. Since the agent has not acted in a way that
contributes directly to the one person’s death, the agent has not “done”
anything to harm the person.
In Rescue II, however, an agent can only save five people by driving
over and—presumably—killing one person. The agent’s saving five peo-
ple contributes directly to the death of the one person. So, the agent’s
most direct contribution is an action, and in this case a “doing.”
Quinn contends that there are special cases where an agent may be
positively relevant to a harmful upshot, even though the agent’s most
direct contribution may be characterized as inaction. His example, called
“Rescue III,” is:
We are off by special train to save five people who are in im-
minent danger of death. Every second counts. You have just
taken over from the driver, who has left the locomotive to at-
tend to something. Since the train is on automatic control
you need do nothing to keep it going. But you can stop it
by putting on the brakes. You suddenly see someone trapped
ahead on the track. Unless you act he will be killed. But if
you do stop, and then free the man, the rescue mission will be
aborted. So you let the train continue. (Quinn, 1989, 298)
The person has not done anything to “let the train continue.” Because on
Quinn’s account the train may act as the person’s agent, the person killed
the man on the tracks.
Despite that the agent of Rescue III has done nothing, it is the agents
failure to act that makes us believe the person is morally culpable. Quinn
argues:
In this case it seems to me that you make the wrong choice.
You must stop the train. It might seem at first that this is
because you occupy, if only temporarily, the role of the driver
and have therefore assumed a driver’s special responsibility to
drive the train safely. But, upon reflection, it would not make
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much moral difference whether you were actually driving the
train or merely had access to its brake. Nor would it much
matter whether you were in the train or had happened upon a
trackside braking device. The important thing from the stand-
point of your agency is that you can stop the train and thereby
prevent it from killing the one. (Quinn, 1989, 299)
Because the agent of Rescue III failed to stop the train, though the agent
clearly could have done so, Quinn believes that the person has acted
wrongly. Not acting, at least in this instance, yields harm to innocent
bystander and therefore ought to be seen as moral wrongdoing.
To get as clear as possible about the role inaction and action play in the
distinction between doing and allowing, Quinn presents one final version
of the Rescue scenario, “Rescue IV.” He writes:
Suppose. . . you are on a train on which there has just been an
explosion. You can stop the train, but that is a complicated
business that would take time. So you set it on automatic
forward and rush back to the five badly wounded passengers.
While attending to them, you learn that a man is trapped far
ahead on the track. You must decide whether to return to the
cabin to save him or stay with the passengers and save them.
(Quinn, 1989, 299)
In Rescue IV, as in Rescue III, your inaction will result in the deaths of
those people trapped on the track. The difference between Rescue III and
Rescue IV, however, is that in Rescue III the agent intends an action of
the train which brings about the trapped person’s death. In Rescue IV,
no such intention is present. The agent intends no action of the train that
ultimately leads to the trapped person’s untimely demise.7 Ultimately:
7In an interesting variant of Rescue IV relegated to a footnote, Quinn admits that if
the agent is “the driver or his designated replacement” who has a special responsibility
to see to it that the train not run over and kill people trapped on the tracks, then the
agent intends for the action of the train to run over the trapped person on the tracks.
Interestingly, Quinn rules out this option because “[i]t does not seem to derive from
any supposition that, if you stay with the passengers, you will really be taking the train
forward or will somehow be party to the fatal action of the train itself” (Quinn, 1989,
299fn24).
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In Rescue III, but not in Rescue IV, the train kills the man
because of your intention that it continue forward. This im-
plicates you, I believe, in the fatal action of the train itself. If
you had no control, but merely wished that the rescue would
continue—or if, as in Rescue IV, you had control but no such
wish—you would not be party to the action of the train. But
the combination of control and intention in Rescue III makes
for a certain kind of complicity. Your choice to let the train
continue forward is strategic and deliberate. Since you clearly
would have it continue for the sake of the five, there is a sense in
which, by deliberately not stopping it, you do have it continue.
For these reasons your agency counts as positive. (Quinn,
1989, 300)
According to Quinn, the moral implication of distinguishing doing
and allowing in this way depends on the distinction between negative
and positive rights, a view he inherits from Philippa Foot (1967). When an
agent’s action or inaction is positively relevant to some harmful upshot,
the agent has violated someone’s negative rights. Positive rights have
been violated when an agent’s action or inaction is negatively relevant
to some harmful consequence. Quinn holds that negative rights must be
more strictly enforced than positive rights. So, a violation of an agent’s
negative rights is worse than a violation of an agent’s positive rights. A
critical aspect of Quinn’s view is that the man on the railroad track has a
say about what harm may befall him. If he does not have a say, then an
agent’s negative rights, something we must uphold more stringently, has
been abandoned.
Quinn’s primary objective is “to find the formulation of the [doing
/ allowing] distinction that best fits our moral intuitions” (Quinn, 1989,
288). He believed the distinction is of the greatest general importance be-
cause “it enters as a strand into many real moral issues and because it
stands in apparent opposition to the most general of all moral theories,
consequentialism” (Quinn, 1989, 288).
Quinn’s four “Rescue” cases seem to speak directly to the concerns
raised against forms of online deception. Because netizens are unable
to discern whether a person is real or fake and because we do take what
others say to us and about us very seriously, we ought to err on the side of
caution and believe that the harmful upshot of online actions or inactions
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are morally wrong. Not alerting other users of a fake social networking
profile is undertaken intentionally. The likelihood of harm befalling a
fake member’s “friends” is increased because the anonymity provided by
the profile allows the user to say potentially very harmful comments to
unsuspecting members.
When netizens deceive other netizens, tragic results could follow. Even
if the netizen “did not mean” for the comments to hasten the death of an-
other person, the harm was allowed to be brought about by the netizen’s
actions. Just in virtue of that fact, we have to judge the netizen’s actions
harshly. Clearly, the person bringing about the harmful upshot has done
something morally wrong.
This section has outlined a distinction between doing and allowing,
according to one of the debates main contributors, Warren Quinn. Then,
I argued that if netizens allow harmful acts to be brought about by their
inaction, i.e., their not alerting others to the deception, we have to say that
they have done something morally wrong.
5 Online deception is harmful
There are some forms of deception, at least in real-time, we cannot do
without. The soldier’s camouflage is one example. Deception often en-
countered in virtual space of social networking fails to protect others in
any way. In fact, it seems that online deception is prone to harm others,
regardless of whether the deceiving agent meant or intended to do so. In
this closing section, I will argue against some potential counterarguments
one might provide in response to my argument.
First, a critic might contend that creating fake social networking pro-
files is morally permissible because it allows the author of the fake pro-
file to express herself openly. This kind of argument presumes that free
speech is protected, and, if the person feels that her rights might be vio-
lated or she could lose her job by openly criticizing her employer online,
she should have the ability to do it pseudonymously. Free speech is pro-
tected, but free speech that harms others certainly is not. Just as we would
not protect harmful speech acts like yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater,
we should not think harmful conversations bringing about a person’s
death is something that ought to be protected either.
Second, one might believe that since we can think of the virtual world
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differently than we think of the real-time world, any event resulting from
online discussions or comments is coincidental. This is a common excuse
bullies use if one of their victims harms themselves. According to this
interpretation, the words did not hurt or bring about the harm to the
victim. After all, correlation is not causation. This argument has no merit.
To believe that Megan Meier’s suicide was not caused by her neighbors
creating a false identity and berating her online is to overlook the fact that
Megan and “Josh,” her supposed online friend, had sown a friendship.
“Josh’s” terrible comments led Megan to commit suicide. Her death was
no coincidence.
Finally, one could defend the use of online deception to protect oneself
from real-time harm befalling oneself or others. If a person creates a
fake Facebook profile and befriends his spouse to uncover the spouse’s
infidelity, then we might think that knowing the truth about the spouse
outweighs the deception involved to discover it. Although this seems like
a strong argument for the moral permissibilty of online deception, the
likelihood that it will lead to morally harmful actions is greater than the
good that might be produced in learning the truth about one’s spouse.
6 Conclusion
There are a variety of examples of real-time and online deception. No
matter how innocuous online deception might seem and that the deceiv-
ing person intended it otherwise or did not mean for some consequence
to follow, it is always morally wrong to deceive someone online. In this
paper, I have argued that deceiving in real-time is morally distinguish-
able from deceiving online because online actions are not as morally
innocuous as actions occurring in real-time. Our failure to detect the
fine-grained characteristics of another virtual netizen leads us to believe
that the person intended to do a moral harm. Openly deceiving someone
on Facebook or Twitter is not a way to build virtual friendships but to
destroy them and, at least sometimes, to end the life of innocent virtual
bystanders.
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